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Abstract. Remote electronic voting has attracted increasing attention
in cryptographic research. A promising protocol presented by Juels et
al. is currently widely discussed. Although it offers a remarkably high
degree of coercion-resistance under reasonable assumptions, it can not
be employed in practice due to its poor efficiency. The improvements
that have been proposed either require stronger trust assumptions or
turned out to be insecure. In this paper, we present an enhancement of
the protocol, which runs in linear time without changing the underlying
trust assumptions.
1 Introduction
Many governments are aiming at introducing modern technology into their vot-
ing processes. Particularly, remote e-voting systems are meant to make voting
easier, faster, and more attractive. As appealing as that may seem, introduc-
ing physical distance between the voter and the ballot-box comes with a price.
Since voters can no longer witness their ballot reach its destination with their
own eyes, they need to be provided with another means of assurance. At first
sight, this seems to be a simple problem, easily solvable by publishing the set
of collected ciphertext votes to let voters verify that their votes have been cast
as intended. However, care needs to be taken. Generally, such an approach will
allow voters to prove violent coercers or generous vote buyers how they voted.
Since voter coercion and vote buying (short: coercion) are highly scalable in
an electronic network environment, they need to be prevented. Unfortunately,
it seems very difficult to prove voters that their vote is cast as intended (in-
dividual verifiability), without allowing them to prove others how they voted
(receipt-freeness).
The protocol underlying this paper was published in 2005 by Juels, Catalano,
and Jakobsson [8], often referred to as the JCJ protocol. Even today, it seems to
be the only known protocol for remote e-voting that offers individual verifiability
and receipt-freeness simultaneously under somewhat acceptable trust assump-
tions. Apart from disabling voters from proving how they voted, the protocol
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even ensures immunity against coercers who try to force voters into handing
out their credentials (simulation attack) or not casting their votes at all (forced
abstention attack). Protocols that avoid all conceivable attacks of coercion are
attributed coercion-resistant. The JCJ protocol offers a remarkably high degree
of coercion-resistance.
Since JCJ imposes unrealistic computational requirements on the tallying
authorities, it can not be employed in a real-world context. Nevertheless, the
protocol is widely discussed and taken as a starting point for further improve-
ments [2–4, 11, 12]. The ultimate goal of these proposals is to reduce the quadratic
running time of the JCJ tallying procedure. We propose our modification of the
JCJ protocol to allow tallying in linear time. Section 2, describes JCJ in more
detail and points out its security properties and trust assumptions. Section 3
presents our modification of the protocol and shows why the security proper-
ties of JCJ are preserved without having to strengthen any trust assumptions.
Section 4 concludes the paper and exposes some open questions.
2 The JCJ Protocol
To achieve receipt-freeness, other protocols need to assume an untappable chan-
nel [10] between authorities and voters at every voting event. Requiring voters
to visit the authorities’ offices at each occasion clearly compromises the spirit of
remote e-voting. JCJ is distinguished by assuming an untappable channel only
during the distribution of the voters’ credentials. Since JCJ allows credentials
to be re-used in many subsequent voting events, they can be distributed easily
when citizens appear in person at the administration offices to register as new
community members.
2.1 Description of the Protocol
In the following paragraphs, we present each phase of the JCJ protocol. Due to
space constraints, we settle for a semi-formal style of exposition. In particular, we
do not thoroughly explain well-known cryptographic techniques. Furthermore,
we assume the application of publicly verifiable group threshold mechanisms
whenever registering or tallying authorities perform joint computations, even if
the text might suggest a single entity. All ciphertexts are ElGamal encryptions
over a pre-established multiplicative cyclic group (Gq, ·, 1) of order q, for which
the decisional Diffie–Hellman problem (DDHP) is assumed to be hard.
Registration. The registrars jointly establish the random credential σ ∈ Gq
and pass it to voter V through an untappable channel. Additionally, they ap-
pend a randomized encryption S = Encε(σ, αS) of σ to V ’s entry in the voter
roll, which is modeled as a public bulletin board. Value αS denotes the encryp-
tion’s randomness, and ε stands for the tallying authorities’ common public key.
Assuming a majority of trustworthy registrars, in the end only V will know σ
and no one will know αS .
Vote Casting. Voter V identifies her choice c from the available set of valid
choices (or candidates) C. To cast the vote, she posts the encryptions A =
Encε(σ, αA) and B = Encε(c, αB) to the public bulletin board, through an
anonymous channel. The pair (A,B) must be accompanied by two non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKP), one to prove knowledge of σ and one to prove
c ∈ C. Requiring the first proof prevents attackers from casting unauthorized
votes by re-encrypting entries from the voter roll (recall that αS is not known to
anyone). Since each authorized vote on the voting board will be decrypted during
the tallying phase, the second proof is needed to prevent coercers from forcing
voters to select c 6∈ C according to some prescribed pattern, thus obtaining a
receipt [6]. To circumvent coercion, the voter can deceive the coercer by posting
a fake vote to the voting board. To do so, V simply claims some σ′ ∈ Gq to be
her real credential and uses it to compute A. She computes B according to the
coercer’s preference and reveals the plaintexts of A and B to justify compliance.
Alternatively, V can even let the coercer compute A and B and cast the vote
using σ′.
Tallying. At the end of the vote casting phase, the voting board contains N
posted votes, of which not all must be counted. First, the talliers verify all proofs
that were cast along with the votes. If a proof does not hold for a vote (A,B),
it is marked accordingly and excluded from further processing. Then the talliers
need to filter out votes that were cast multiple times with a proper credential
and votes that were cast with a fake credential. For both tasks, the authors of
JCJ propose the application of a plaintext equivalence test (PET) [7]. Given two
ElGamal encryptions X = Encε(x, αX) and Y = Encε(y, αY ), the algorithm
PET(X,Y ) returns true for x = y and false for x 6= y, without revealing any
information on x or y.4
Removing Duplicates. Exclude from further processing all (Ai, Bi), for which
the voting board contains (Aj , Bj), i 6= j, such that PET(Ai, Aj) returns
true. Given that the voting board contains the votes in the order as cast,
a “last-vote-counts” (“first-vote-counts”) policy is implemented by starting
the search with big (small) values j. This exhaustive search over the entire
voting board of size N runs in O(N2) time.
Removing Invalid Votes. Invalid votes could easily be excluded from the
tally by applying PET(Si, Aj) in an exhaustive search over all values Si
of the voter roll and all values Aj of the voting board, similarly to the previ-
ous step. However, that would allow the voters to prove the coercer how they
voted. To prevent that, the voter roll and the voting board are mixed and
re-encrypted using a verifiable re-encryption mixnet, resulting in values Ŝi
and (Âj , B̂j), respectively. Now talliers compute PET(Ŝi, Âj) for all pairs Ŝi
and Âj . If the algorithm returns true for some index i, B̂j is decrypted and
counted in the tally. This procedure runs in O(N ·n) time, where n denotes
the size of the voter roll.
4 A common way of performing PET in a homomorphic encryption scheme is to check
whether the decryption of (X/Y )z equals 1 for some random value z ∈ Zq.
If the voting board is flooded with a large number of fake votes, N may be orders
of magnitudes larger than n, which implies that the JCJ tallying procedure has
an O(N2) worst-case running time (quadratic with respect to the number of
votes). This makes the scheme not only vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks,
but also practically infeasible in large-scale settings. The authors of Civitas, a
running prototype implementation based on JCJ, have shown this in [5].
2.2 Security Properties and Assumptions
We briefly want to point out, to which degree JCJ satisfies the key requirements
privacy and accuracy, and why JCJ provides a high level of coercion-resistance.
Privacy is motivated by the notion of the secrecy of the vote. It is satisfied if no
vote can be linked to the voter from whom it originates. Accuracy captures the
notion that all (and only) legitimate votes are tallied as cast.
Privacy. With respect to privacy, JCJ relies on the security of the anonymous
channel and the trustworthiness of the tallying and mixing authorities. Since a
majority of tallying authorities could collude to jointly decrypt entries of the
voter roll and the voting board, they could easily break privacy. Similarly, the
mixing authorities could violate privacy by jointly establishing a link from the
decrypted votes back to the voter roll. In both cases, the violation of privacy
could be hidden by the conspiring parties.
Accuracy. By observing the voting board, voters verify that their vote has been
cast as intended. Changing or removing votes from the tally would be detected
by the public. Adding illegitimate votes requires the knowledge of a credential
σ that complies with a value S in the voter roll. Since all values S are related to
a voter enlisted in the voter roll, adding an illegitimate value could be noticed
by voters that are about to register. Attacks of that kind are thus not scalable.
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, a colluding majority of authorities
could secretly decrypt S to obtain V ’s valid credential σ. However, if they use
σ for casting votes, they could be exposed by V when the corresponding PET
algorithm returns true at removing duplicates during the tallying procedure.
Coercion-Resistance. Assuming that the coercer cannot communicate with
the registrars, voters can always lie about their credentials σ. They are thus pro-
tected against coercers that want to push them into voting in a prescribed way,
voting at random, or handing out their credentials. If the coercer wants V to
abstain from voting, V can still cast a vote, given at least one moment of privacy.
As pointed out before, we allow a minority of authorities to be untrusted. Disal-
lowing communication between the coercer and all registrars would strengthen
that assumption. However, allowing communication would enable the coercer to
force the voter into handing out the proper credential: The coercer could claim
knowledge about the secret share that a colluding registrar has provided to V ,
without saying which one. To be safe, V needs to hand out all secrets truthfully.
We therefore need to assume that the voter knows at least one registrar not col-
luding with the coercer. Note that this is not implied by assuming any majority
of trustworthy registrars. Thus, V can lie to the coercer about that secret.
3 Coercion-Resistance in Linear Time
We pointed out that the steps to remove duplicate and illegitimate votes are in-
efficient in the original JCJ protocol. This issue is widely discussed and has been
addressed in the literature. Before presenting our enhancement of the scheme, we
introduce two highly promising known approaches, that also aim at improving
efficiency at tallying.
Scheme by Smith and Weber [11–13]. Instead of applying PET(Ai, Aj)
on all pairs of distinct ciphertexts for removing duplicates, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ,
both Smith and Weber in essence suggest computing and decrypting Az1 =
Encε(σz1), . . . ,A
z
N = Encε(σ
z
N ), where z ∈ Zq is a random value shared among
the talliers. The resulting blinded values σzi are stored in a hash table for colli-
sion detection in linear time. Clearly, σi = σj , iff σzi = σ
z
j . Both authors propose
using the same procedure for eliminating illegitimate votes. In that case, how-
ever, based on the fact that the same exponent z is used across all ciphertexts,
the coercer gets an attack strategy to identify whether a vote with known σ is
counted [2, 5, 9]. Note that this attack does not apply at removing duplicates.
Scheme by Araujo et al. [1–3]. To solve the efficiency problem of the JCJ
scheme, the authors suggest an approach based on group signatures. At registra-
tion, voters obtain their credential. Unlike JCJ, no public values are related to
voter roll entries. Their credentials enable the voters to deduce invalid creden-
tials and mislead coercers. If the provided proofs hold, duplicates on the voting
board are publicly identifiable by the equality of two values that are cast along
with the vote. After mixing the relevant values on the voting board, the tallying
authorities use their private keys to identify the legitimate votes. Notably, all
information on their legitimacy is sent along with the vote itself, but can only be
assessed by a sufficiently large group of talliers. Fully avoiding matches between
cast values and voter roll entries summarizes the essence of this elegant approach
to avoid the inefficient comparison procedure.
An inherent weakness of this approach is the fact that a majority of col-
luding registrars could compute valid (but illegitimate) credentials unnoticed.
As described earlier, adding illegitimate votes to the tally in JCJ requires the
knowledge of a credential σ that complies with an entry S in the voter roll, i.e.,
such attacks could easily be detected. This is not the case in Araujo et al.’s
scheme. Nevertheless, we believe that the approach holds much potential.
3.1 Description of the Enhanced Protocol
Our enhancement strongly relates to the original JCJ, so the modifications are
easily summarized. For removing duplicates, we propose using the linear-time
scheme proposed by Smith and Weber. For identifying the legitimate votes, we
suggest preserving the use of the voter roll. The key to efficiency lies in requiring
voters to indicate which voter roll entry their vote (A,B) relates to. Talliers
then apply PET only on respective re-encryptions of A and S, where S is the
public value copied from the indicated voter roll entry. Authorizing legitimate
votes thus becomes linear over the total number of cast votes. In the following
paragraphs, we present the protocol in further detail. Later we justify why the
security properties of JCJ are preserved under unchanged trust assumptions.
Registration. The registration step is conducted according to JCJ. Addition-
ally, we assume that a distinct public number i is assigned to each voter. For
simplicity, we take i to be the index of V ’s entry in the voter roll.
Vote Casting. To cast a vote, V performs the same steps as in JCJ. Addi-
tionally to posting values A and B along with corresponding proofs, V posts the
value C = Encε(i, αC), accompanied by a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
to prove knowledge of i. The tallying authorities will later use i to locate Si on
the voter roll and efficiently detect legitimate votes. Note that the voting board
must also accept wrong values C 6= Encε(i, αC).
Tallying. After excluding votes with invalid proofs, the talliers add a random
number Xi of additional fake votes for each voter (see discussion below). After
removing duplicates by applying Smith’s and Weber’s scheme on values Ai, the
resulting adjusted list is passed as input to a first re-encryption mixnet, which
outputs tuples (Âj , B̂j , Ĉj). Next, the talliers jointly decrypt Ĉj into i and es-
tablish a list of tuples (Âj , B̂j , Si). Votes for which the decryption renders an
invalid index i 6∈ {1, . . . , n} are excluded from further processing. The remaining
tuples (Âj , B̂j , Si) are then passed to a second re-encryption mixnet, which out-
puts tuples (A˜j , B˜j , Ŝi). Now the talliers perform PET(A˜j , Ŝi) for each tuple. If
the algorithm returns true, B˜j is decrypted and counted.
The generation of additional fake votes is important to conceal the existence
of a real vote after employing the first mixnet, where the encrypted voter roll
indices i are decrypted. The presence of fake votes at that point enables voters
to repudiate the fact of having posted a valid vote. The fake votes must be
generated and published by trustworthy authorities, such that the exact number
of fake votes for voter V is not revealed. We will later argue that it is sufficient
if the registrar, who enjoys V ’s trust, posts a random number X ≥ 1 of fake
votes designated to V . Clearly, if X is independent of N for all voters, then our
tallying procedure runs in O(N) time (provided that each of the two mixnets
runs in linear time).
3.2 Security Properties and Assumptions
In JCJ, coercion-resistance is based on the voter’s ability to lie about σ and
secretly cast the real vote in a private moment. Note that by witnessing the voter
casting a vote, the coercer will need to assume that the voter did not reveal the
proper credential. Thus, that one moment of privacy is required in any mode
of coercion, not only in the event of a forced abstention attack. The voter may
then claim not having cast any vote, except possibly the one instructed by the
coercer, posted with a fake credential. We will now argue why this argument
yields coercion-resistance in our scheme as well.
During the vote casting phase, the voting board reveals no more information
to the coercer than in JCJ. During the tallying phase, however, the coercer learns
how many votes are related to V ’s entry in the voter roll. Let x denote that
number. The coercer’s strategy is to decide, whether x is distributed according
to the same random distribution as for the other voters or if it is greater by one.
Taking the Risk. To decide whether x originates from X or X + 1 based
on one sample (or even a few in case of repeated coercion in subsequent voting
events) seems hardly feasible. This conjecture is additionally supported by the
fact that other voters may also attribute fake votes to V . We believe that V is
likely to take the small risk of being caught, in case V is not exposed to the
risk of being punished. If the coercer needs to assume that voters will generally
not fear getting caught, any coercion attack seems obsolete. Therefore, we are
confident that this notion suffices for solving the vote buying problem, which is
the only concern in many countries regarding the notion of coercion.
Understanding the Risk. The more voter V fears consequences in the event
of getting caught, the more important it becomes to quantify the risk. V will
agree to co-operate with the coercer unless V is actually convinced that the risk
of getting caught is vanishingly low. That it is infeasible to decide whether x
originates from X or X+1 given a distribution function FX with a high standard
deviation, even over reasonably small values, is a hypothesis we will quantify in
our future work. For the time being, we relate the problem to an analogy in JCJ.
We thus give an idea of how the distribution function FX for determining the
random value X needs to be defined, in order to make our scheme as secure as
JCJ. Recall that in JCJ, V needs a time-slice ∆t of privacy for casting the real
vote. Note that the coercer may monitor the voting board at the beginning and
at the end of that time-slice. Let x′ denote the number of votes posted during
that time. The coercer’s strategy is to decide whether x′ is distributed according
to the same random distribution as the other values x′i of the remaining m− 1
time-slices of equal length (if T denotes the total length of the voting period, we
have m = T∆t ). If JCJ is coercion-resistant for defined n and m, an average of
x′ = Nm votes is sufficient to disguise V ’s additional vote (or x
′ = nm assuming
all voters participate and post one vote only). V obviously enjoys the same
protection in our scheme, if the registrar’s random function FX produces an
average of x = nm fake votes. The same distribution function FX can then be
employed in the case of a greater number of voters n.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown a new protocol that solves the efficiency problem in coercion-
resistant remote e-voting, without changing the trust assumptions and the secu-
rity features of JCJ. We pointed out that coercion-resistance of both JCJ and
our scheme assumes a private moment for voters to secretly cast their vote. This
is only sufficient if the coercer can not deduce from the voting board whether
voters took advantage of their privacy. We have related this problem to distin-
guishing whether x is distributed as X or X + 1 for reasonably small values and
a high standard deviation of FX , where there is one sample per voting event. In
our future work, we will show formally that this problem is infeasible to solve
and thus justify JCJ and our scheme to be sufficiently secure against coercion
attacks under the known assumptions.
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